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Can a democracy attract competent leaders, while attaining broad representation? Eco-
nomic models suggest that free-riding incentives and lower opportunity costs give the less
competent a comparative advantage at entering political life. Moreover, if elites have more
human capital, selecting on competence may lead to uneven representation. This paper
examines patterns of political selection among the universe of municipal politicians and na-
tional legislators in Sweden, using extraordinarily rich data on competence traits and social
background for the entire population. We document four new facts that together charac-
terize an “inclusive meritocracy.” First, politicians are on average significantly smarter and
better leaders than the population they represent. Second, this positive selection is present
even when conditioning on family (and hence social) background, suggesting that individual
competence is key for selection. Third, the representation of social background, whether
measured by parental earnings or occupational social class, is remarkably even. Fourth,
there is at best a weak tradeoff in selection between competence and social representation,
mainly due to strong positive selection of politicians of low (parental) socioeconomic sta-
tus. A broad implication of these facts is that it is possible for democracy to generate
competent and socially-representative leadership.
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I. Introduction
The identity of politicians influence which policies get selected, how well they
are implemented, and who benefits from them.1 This is undisputable for autocracies
where rulers face few constraints. But it is also true for representative democracies,
as policy platforms do not constitute complete enforceable contracts. Most voters
would therefore like to elect highly able policymakers for choosing and implementing
policies to attain a given objective (throughout, we use “able” and “competent”
interchangeably). As a collective, voters may also want to elect policymakers who
represent diverse interests, so that government will pursue broad objectives.
Whether representative democracy can deliver both high-ability politicians and
broad representation is unclear. Visibly inept leaders are elected around the world.
Moreover, economic models of politics hold that lower opportunity costs give the less
able a comparative advantage at entering public life (Caselli and Morelli, 2004) and
that this effect may be compounded by free-riding incentives (Messner and Polborn
(2004), see also Olson (1965)). But even if it is possible to select competent politi-
cians, doing so may make it harder to ensure broad representation when competence
is unequally distributed. Related to this, a number of scholars have argued that
electoral systems shape the tradeoff between accountability – a driver of selection –
and representation.2
To better understand political selection, and the potential tradeoffs it entails,
we need to thoroughly describe selection patterns and analyze their determinants.
Unfortunately, insufficient data has made it difficult to carry out these tasks.
Three data limitations First, any study of political selection should account for
candidate entry and screening by voters or parties. To study candidate screening, one
needs information on both elected and non-elected politicians. While information on
the former is sometimes available, information on the latter is remarkably sparse. A
few studies have tried to tackle this limitation to advance our knowledge of candidate
selection.3 Unfortunately, this literature does not address candidate entry, which
requires information on those who never attempted to enter into politics.
1. See for example Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997), Pande (2003), Chat-
topadhyay and Duflo (2004), Jones and Olken (2005), Washington (2008), Besley et al. (2011),
Meyersson (2014).
2. A common idea is that plurality rule fosters better accountability, while proportional repre-
sentation fosters better representation (Myerson, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Powell, 2000;
Taagepera and Shugart, 2000).
3. Examples include: Besley et al. (2005), Ferraz and Finan (2009), Galasso and Nannicini
(2011), Beath et al. (2014), Jia et al. (2015), Tillmann (2014), Folke and Rickne (2016).
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Second, the relevant theory stresses the quality of selected politicians. But how
to measure quality? Absent direct data on the underlying intelligence or personality
of politicians, the existing empirical literature has relied on education or pre-office
income (Ba¨ck and O¨hrvall, 2004; Dal Bo´ et al., 2009; Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Merlo
et al., 2010; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Gagliar-
ducci and Paserman, 2012). While correlated with ability, these proxies also likely
reflect luck or social class.
Third, representation is hard to measure. Previous work has relied on measures
like occupation. However, occupation is coarse: many politicians may be lawyers,
but if values and loyalties depend on social background, one would like to know
if they were brought up as elite or working class. This requires difficult-to-obtain
intergenerational information.
In sum, we know of no research that analyzes selection based on a comprehensive
bundle of traits that accurately reflect the ability and representativeness of politi-
cians.
Sweden as a test bed Our study overcomes these limitations by using fine-grained
administrative data from Sweden. Clearly, conclusions based on evidence from a sin-
gle country cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the world, though we take a (very
limited) step towards comparisons by studying different Swedish jurisdictions. But
Sweden is of interest for both its commonalities and differences with other countries.
Its politics is based on proportional-representation elections, the most common form
in the world. Sweden is also a quintessential advanced democracy. It has remained
stable and fully democratic with a top score on the 20-step Polity-IV scale since
1917, a full century during which other states gradually moved towards democracy.
Sweden is thus an institutional exemplar many countries around the world may be
approaching. When debating the value of democracy it is natural to ask if a demo-
cratic transition can improve the ability and representativeness of leaders. If Sweden
displayed incompetent and unrepresentative leaders, advocates of democratization
may have to resort to different arguments.
Data Our data allow us to undertake the most thorough description to date of ba-
sic political selection patterns based on rich measures of individual ability and social
background. The ability measures include evaluations of IQ and leadership potential
for the 1951-1980 cohorts, done by the military on all males, and an estimate of
individual earning capacity for the whole population stemming from a fully satu-
rated Mincer regression developed by Besley et al. (2016). Our social-background
data entail reliable intergenerational information, namely social class as reflected in
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parental incomes and occupations (a traditional approach in sociology).
We study not only national members of parliament (MPs), but also politicians
in municipalities – which provide the bulk of public services – to take advantage of
large numbers and within-country variation.
Positive selection? We uncover new statistics on political selection for Sweden
as a whole. Standard models of occupational choice predict adverse selection: able
people with higher private incomes and more promising careers face a higher cost to
enter public life. Nevertheless, we document strong positive selection along all ability
measures even though politicians have substantially higher pre-office incomes – hence,
higher opportunity costs – than the general population. Selection monotonically
improves from those nominated (but not elected) to municipal council, to rank-and-
file elected municipal council members, to mayors, and finally to MPs. Mayors and
MPs are as positively selected as members of elite occupations in the private and
public sectors.
Elitism vs. meritocracy? In a world where ability correlates positively with
socioeconomic status, the strong positive selection we document could reflect very
different regimes. One possibility, “elitism,” is that rich families have privileged ac-
cess to political power. Then, selection based on privilege will yield an accidentally
competent political class. Another possibility, “exclusive meritocracy,” is that poli-
tics selects the competent, which makes the political class (accidentally) elitist. The
third possibility, “inclusive meritocracy,” is that politics selects competent politicians
broadly representative of all social backgrounds.
To determine which one of these regimes prevails, we ask whether political se-
lection is driven mostly by social origin or by individual traits. Politicians turn out
to be positively selected, not only relative to the population, but also relative to
their own siblings who share their social background. This strong role for individual
ability rules out the pure elitist regime. To discriminate between different meritoc-
racies, we examine the social origin of politicians. While politicians themselves are
disproportionately high-earning, their parents’ social class and earnings approximate
a perfect replica of the entire population. This pattern does not look accidental: dif-
ferent political parties represent different segments of the income distribution in a
way that reflects their policy stance.
How is inclusive meritocracy achieved? Swedish politics attracts competent
people who are not restricted to the scions of elite families. Two facts could conspire
against this outcome. First, competence correlates positively with social class, so
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one should expect a tradeoff between competence and broad representation. Second,
politicians have high pre-office earnings and the higher opportunity costs should push
toward adverse selection on competence. How can inclusive meritocracy emerge? We
answer this question in two ways. First, although ability rises with socioeconomic
status on average, politicians remain highly able when recruited from low socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. In fact, relative to their own social class, politicians from lower
social backgrounds are even more strongly selected than politicians from higher social
backgrounds. This mitigates the tradeoff between competence and representation.
Second, an analysis of party screening and individual incentives to self-select into
politics yields some suggestive take-aways. Parties appear to screen positively, pro-
moting more competent individuals to higher ranks regardless of their social class. In
addition, pecuniary considerations appear to matter for self-selection decisions, but
a combination of strong intrinsic motivation and high wages for full-time positions
preserves the incentives of able individuals to enter politics.
Organization of paper In the next section, we offer background information
on the Swedish political system. Section 3 describes our data and their sources. In
Section 4, we present results on political selection in terms of competence. In Section
5, we explore the social background of politicians and characterize Swedish politics
as an inclusive meritocracy where selection on competence goes together with broad
social representation. Section 6 briefly discusses the drivers of inclusive meritocracy:
how competence and inclusivity go together, and forces shaping selection such as
individual incentives and party screening. Section 7 concludes. Auxiliary material is
collected in an Online Appendix.
II. Background
Sweden’s electoral system Sweden has three administrative levels of govern-
ment. Every four years (three years prior to 1994), elections are run for 290 munici-
palities, 20 counties, and the nation. All elections take place on the same day with a
turnout between 80 and 90 percent. In each election, citizens cast a separate party
ballot, a ranked list with a large number of candidates. This system elects a total
of 349 MPs, 1,100 county-council members, and 13,000 municipal-council members.
Our paper is focused on the first and third groups.
In Sweden’s proportional-representation (PR) system, seat shares in the munic-
ipal councils and the national parliament closely trace the vote shares of political
parties. Until 1998, seats for each party were allocated from the top of the ballot.
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Since 1998, voters can also cast an optional preference vote for one candidate. But
this reform has only allowed a handful of politicians from lower ranks to bypass the
party’s list order and win a seat.4
Based on the distribution of council or parliament seats, a ruling majority (or
minority) is formed. These often form within the left bloc (Social Democrats, Left
Party, and Green Party) or the center-right bloc (Conservatives, Center Party, Lib-
eral Party, and Christian Democrats). Occasionally, the largest local party in a mu-
nicipality wins more than half of the seats and rules on its own. In our time period,
two anti-immigration parties (New Democracy, in the 90s, and Sweden Democrats,
in the 00s) have also been represented, but these are rarely part of governing ma-
jorities. Local parties (running only in one municipality) also exist, but usually hold
less than 5 percent of the seats.
Members of parliament (MPs) All members of the national parliament are
full-time politicians, who spend much of their time in the parliament’s various com-
mittees. The members are elected to office in one of 21 constituencies, where most of
the members still have their residence. They are nominated on the constituency bal-
lot of their political party, often after an earlier career in municipal politics. Among
the parliamentarians elected in 2010, 72 percent had been elected to a municipal
council for the same party at some point after 1982.
Municipal governance The council is the only directly elected body in each
municipality. It has a board – the local analog of the national cabinet – to which
members are appointed by the governing coalition to mirror the seat distribution.
The largest party in the coalition selects the chair: henceforth, the “mayor.” The
political opposition usually appoints an executive as well, the “vice mayor.”
The mayor holds an important office: municipalities play a crucial role as service
providers in the economy, spending about 25 percent of Sweden’s GDP and employing
20 percent of its workforce. Municipal politicians are responsible for the areas of K-
12 education, child care, elderly care, and local infrastructure, and finance these
commitments through a local income tax of around 20 percent. Being a mayor (or
a vice mayor) is thus commonly seen as a more influential and prestigious position
than a common member of the national parliament, not only in the major cities of
Sweden but also in mid-size municipalities.5
4. This reflects voter “abstention” from the optional vote, a concentration of votes for candidates
at the top of the ballot, and high thresholds. See Folke et al. (2016) for a thorough analysis of the
preference-vote system and its consequences.
5. This is often borne out by revealed preference in the choices by politicians. Zetterberg (1988)
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Ruling over the Swedish welfare state used to be a Social Democratic prerog-
ative. But in the past few decades, political competition has grown substantially
more intense. This can be illustrated by the changing proportion of left-bloc local
governments over time: it increased from 31 percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 1998,
only to fall back down to 59 percent in 2002 and 41 percent in 2006.
Running for local office Depending on municipality size (from 2,558 to 780,817
inhabitants), local party members are divided into “clubs,”like the women’s and
youth clubs. A citizen who enters politics becomes a party member and joins one or
several clubs. All routes to office go through existing parties (short of forming a new
party). Local parties compose their municipal electoral ballots without interference
of the central party. A local political career may reach the top of the local party
hierarchy – for the largest majority and minority parties, becoming mayor or vice
mayor – or in a few cases a national parliamentary seat.
Sweden has a strong normative tradition of so-called “leisure politicians”, where
local political service is a spare-time activity complementing one’s work in the regular
labor market. Consequently, almost all elected council members receive only piece-
rate compensation for time spent in meetings.6 Previous research has also shown no
indirect monetary gains to winning a seat in a municipal assembly (Lundqvist, 2013).
But the mayor is a full-time political employee, and in most municipalities the vice
mayor also gets a part-time salary. The mayor’s wage, determined by the municipal
council, is typically in the top 5 percent of the Swedish earnings distribution. Beyond
this economic return, becoming a mayor is associated with high social status and
substantial political power.
Monetary costs to running for local office are minimal. All candidates run on a
party ballot, and campaign finance is mostly paid by tax money channeled to parties
rather than candidates. Individual campaigns for preference votes are modest, with
the vast majority spending less than 600 USD at the municipal level. Even these
small costs are usually paid by the party or by outside donors, rather than by the
individual herself (SOU, 2007).
A qualitative literature on Swedish politics suggests that key motives to enter pol-
makes a general case, and specific instances have been reported, for example in the mid-size munici-
palities of Falun (Sveriges Radio, 2006), Landskrona (Helsingborgs Dagblad, 2006), and So¨derhamn
(Hela Ha¨lsningland, 2010).
6. This part-time arrangement may at first seem odd to the reader. However, part-time po-
litical service is quite common throughout the world. For example, state legislators in a number
of US states only serve around half time on average with quite a modest compensation – see
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx
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itics are intrinsic concerns with policy, or a desire for social interaction in policy cir-
cles (Karlsson, 2001). However, pecuniary concerns are also present, especially when
experienced leisure politicians contemplate full-time appointments (Dahl, 2011).
Voter preferences and selection Swedish citizens value a competent and socially
representative political class. When asked about their party choice, voters have
ranked politician competence among the top three reasons for the past decades, along
with ideology and issue voting (Statistics Sweden, 2010). When asked about what
social dimensions merit influential positions, voters rank gender fist, closely followed
by age, social group, and geographic area (Djerf-Pierre and Niklasson, 2010).
As for representation, left-bloc parties traditionally represent blue-collar workers,
while center-right parties represent white-collar workers. In a recent survey of newly
elected politicians, 48 percent of Social Democrats saw themselves as working class,
and 42 percent as middle class. Among Conservatives, 5 percent saw themselves as
working class, 42 percent as middle class, and the rest as upper class. Outside these
two large parties, the Center party has traditionally represented farmers and people
in rural areas. Within parties, social representation is advanced via strategies to
increase representation of women, foreign-born, and the young (Freidenvall, 2006).
III. Data
To characterize political selection, we assemble (to our knowledge) the most de-
tailed and comprehensive data set to date. In this section we briefly summarize our
sources, key variables, and sample definitions.
Sources Our empirical analysis is based on individual-level data from various
sources. Our first dataset contains all elected and non-elected individual candidates
that ran for national or municipal political office during the period of 1982-2010, over
200,000 unique individuals. Prior to each election, each political party must report its
ordered list, with a personal identification code for each listed politician. These lists
are kept by Statistics Sweden and, in some cases, regional electoral authorities. After
each election, another record is created with a complete list of all elected politicians
from each party. Altogether, our sample has roughly 50,000 elected individuals.
We link these data on politicians to several administrative registers from Statistics
Sweden for the whole population (aged 16 and above). For most variables, our data
hold annual records from 1979 to 2012 for the entire population, approximately
14 million unique men and women. These data contain detailed demographic and
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background information (e.g., age, sex, education level, and occupation), as well as
earnings. Given this information, we can precisely characterize how the personal
traits of politicians relate to those in the entire population.
We use the Multigenerational Register to identify siblings and parents. We use
only biological parents and, as the data begin in 1979, we face a natural truncation.
Nevertheless, for politicians elected after 2000, we observe the father’s income in
1979 for 77 percent of the sample, and the mother’s income for 86 percent of the
sample.
Various types of annual earnings for the entire population are available from the
Swedish Tax Authority. We also have universal annual information about individual
sector of employment for the whole period. However, occupation is only recorded on
a yearly basis from 2003. To bridge this gap, we complement the occupation data
with earlier information from Censuses (done every five years).
Our last piece of individual-level data come from the Swedish Defense Recruit-
ment Agency. Military enlistment tests measure the mental capacities of Swedish
men (see further below). Although a mandatory draft was instituted in 1901, full
records are only kept for cohorts born 1951 and onward. For quality reasons, we also
truncate the data for men born after 1980. For these 30 cohorts, enlistment rates
were around 90 percent.
Electoral results are linked to our dataset at the municipal level from records
kept by the Swedish Electoral Agency. These give us the vote shares for every party
in every election. Data on the party that appointed the mayor was obtained from
Kfakta, a database collected by Leif Johansson (Department of Political Science,
University of Lund).
The enlistment procedure The enlistment process for military service spans two
days and evaluates a person’s medical status, physical fitness, and cognitive abilities.
About 75 percent of the men in our sample who took the test did so at 18, while
about 25 percent took it at 19 (less than 0.5 percent were below 18 or above 19).
Since enlistment generally occurs in the year of high-school graduation, test scores
are not influenced by university training. As tests were high-stakes – better results
gave more rewarding military placements – data quality is considered high. Takers
were not informed of their precise results.
We use two scores from the enlistment procedure – the cognitive score and the
leadership score. Each of these is standardized to a scale from 1 to 9.
Cognitive score Cognitive ability is scored from a written test, assessing ability
in problem solving, induction capacity, numerical, verbal, spatial, and technology
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comprehension (St˚ahlberg-Carlstedt and Sko¨ld, 1981). Army expert Berit Carlstedt
(2000) argues that the Swedish enlistment test is a good measure of general intelli-
gence. This differentiates it from others, such as the US Armed Forces Qualification
Test, which focuses more on “crystallized” intelligence, i.e., teachable skills. We can
thus think of the cognitive score as an IQ score. The (stanine) scale is such that a 5
is reserved for the middle 20 percentiles of the test population, while 6, 7, and 8, are
given to the next 17, 12, and 7 percentiles, and the top score of 9 to the uppermost
4 percentiles (scoring below 5 is symmetric).7
Leadership score Individuals who score a 5 or higher on the cognitive test go
through an in-depth evaluation for a possible military leadership position. Trained
psychologists administer a semi-structured interview to determine a 1-9 leadership
score. Before the interview, the psychologist sees information about the conscript’s
cognitive test, physical endurance, muscular strength, school grades, and answers to
70-80 questions about friends, family, and hobbies, etc. The exact interview manual
is classified information, but the test is known to evaluate a conscript’s personality
in civilian life, and his ability to handle military functions. Specifically, the score
summarizes four personality traits: social maturity, psychological energy, intensity,
and emotional stability. These are closely related to the well-known Big-5 personality
traits (extraversion, consciousness, openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism) –
see the Online Appendix, Table B.1.
Education Educational attainment of all individuals is reported by Swedish schools
and universities, and records are kept by Statistics Sweden. For people migrating
into Sweden later in life, information on schooling is collected through surveys and
education levels are categorized into a Swedish standard. These categories are easily
translated into years of education.
Income We use a measure of annual disposable income, constructed from individ-
ual tax records (there is no joint family taxation) including all income sources and
government transfers (wages and in-kind benefits from jobs, pensions, transfers and
subsidies, business income, capital income, sickness and parental-leave benefits, etc.).
7. In terms of standard deviations, scores translate as follows 1: below -1.75, 2: -1.75 to -1.25,
3: -1.25 to -0.75, 4: -0.75 to -0.25, 5: -0.25 to 0.25, 6: 0.25 to 0.75, 7: 0.75 to 1.25, 8: 1.25 to 1.75,
and 9: above 1.75.
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Earnings score If ability is priced in the market, it shows up in earnings. Earnings
may also reflect a number of other personal characteristics, however, such as educa-
tion, choice of employment, or time and place of employment. To get at a measure
of relative earnings power that more likely reflects personal ability, we construct an
earnings score following the approach of Besley et al. (2016). These authors use
residuals from a Mincer equation, defined over a large set of socioeconomic char-
acteristics. As estimating a fully saturated model with millions of observations is
computationally challenging, we estimate the Mincer equation year by year. Specif-
ically, we estimate:
yi,m,t = f(agei,t, educi,t, empli,t) + αm + εi,m,t , (1)
where the dependent variable yi,m,t is the disposable income for person i in munici-
pality m in year t. Among the independent variables, agei,t is a set of age indicators
(over 5-year intervals), educi,t is a binary indicator for tertiary education, and empli,t
is a set of indicators for 15 activity codes.8 The function f represents a full set of age-
education-employment interactions. The regression also includes municipality fixed
effects αm to capture systematic income differences across regions, or urban and ru-
ral areas. This flexible specification allows for different age-earnings profiles across
occupational sectors and education levels. For each individual, we compute residuals
εi,m,t for each available year, and then average across years. This “individual fixed
effect” is our earnings score.
To minimize measurement error and endogeneity, we drop observations for full-
time politicians, both in office and after exiting office. We estimate equation (1)
separately by gender and retirement status (age over 65 or not) in order not to con-
found the competence measure with the substantial labor-market differences across
these groups.9
8. These are the same as the European NACE code and international ICIC code, namely: “Agri-
culture, hunting and forestry,” “Fishing,” “Mining and quarrying,” “Manufacturing,” “Electricity,
gas and water supply,” “Construction,” “Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, mo-
torcycles and personal and household goods,” “Hotels and restaurant,” “Transport, storage and
communication,” “Financial intermediation,” “Real estate, renting and business activities,” “Pub-
lic administration and defense; compulsory social security,” “Education,” “Health and social work,”
and “Other community, social and personal service activities.” Two categories, “Activities of house-
holds” and “Extra-territorial organization and bodies” have less than 30 individual-year observa-
tions in them. Because of this, we add the former to “Other community, social and personal service
activities,” and the latter to “Public administration and defense; compulsory social security.”
9. For example, women take on the bulk of parental leave and care activities that raise the gender
pay gap when couples have children. As for retirement, there are plenty of senior politicians. Mincer
equations of retired and working people differ as retirees do not have a current employment sector.
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Does the earnings score measure a competence for politics rather than just ability
to generate market income? Besley et al. (2016) address that question and show that
earnings scores are indeed correlated with cognitive and leadership ability as well as
various measures of political and policy success.
Summary statistics Table I reports means of the four ability variables for politi-
cians and the entire population (subject to availability), pooling the election years
of 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010 (the patterns we document below remain
current: they do not change if we focus on the most recent year). In order to ac-
count for the fact that politicians of different quality may serve for different lengths
of time, affecting the composition of the political class, an individual politician’s
observation is included as many times as he/she was elected. For municipalities, we
distinguish between the nominated (but non-elected), elected, and mayors. We also
include information on national MPs. Compared to the population, Swedish politi-
cians under-represent women and the foreign born. Of mayors, less than 30 percent
are women and less than 3 percent foreign born. We do not address these important
forms of under-representation any further. But the most striking point of the data is
a main topic in our analysis: Swedish politicians are positively selected based on all
four ability measures. The progression of mean cognitive and leadership scores from
nominated to elected to mayor to MP suggests increasing rates of positive selection.
[Table 1 about here]
Table B.2 in the Online Appendix shows pair-wise correlations between our com-
petence measures for the Swedish male population in 2011. All measures are posi-
tively correlated, but not very highly. Years of schooling has correlations of 0.51, 0.30
and 0.076 with the cognitive, leadership, and earnings scores, respectively. While the
best measure of competence is an open issue, these simple correlations highlight the
hazards of relying solely on years of schooling as a metric of ability. The leadership
score and the cognitive score have a correlation of 0.34, and the earnings score has
correlations of 0.20 and 0.17 with the leadership and cognitive scores, respectively.
Our different measures thus appear to capture different dimensions of ability.
We compute the income residuals of retirees based on the main sector of employment in their
working-life.
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IV. Competence
In this section, we rely on the universe of municipal and national politicians
to answer the question whether selection on competence is positive or – as theory
would have us expect – adverse. Our first contribution is to compare the ability
characteristics of politicians to those of the general population. We study the four
different ability dimensions introduced in Section 3. To repeat, the education and
earnings scores are available for the full population, while the cognitive and leadership
scores are available only for men.
Leadership and cognitive scores The top-left graph in Figure I shows over-
lapped histograms for the leadership scores of the general (male) population, three
categories of municipal politicians – nominated but not elected, elected, and mayors
– and MPs. A clear pattern of positive selection emerges. Leadership scores of the
nominated look quite close to those of the population but with a slight shift to the
right – scores above the population mean of 5.3 are more highly represented among
nominated politicians than in the general population.10 For elected politicians, the
shift to the right is stronger, and even more so for mayors and MPs. For example,
mayors have more than a full additional point – 70 percent of a population standard
deviation – higher leadership scores than the population (henceforth, σ denotes a
population standard deviation).
[Figure 1 about here]
The top-right graph shows a similar result for the cognitive score. Politicians
score higher than the average Swede, more strongly so when elected to office, and
particularly so when selected for top-municipal office and parliament. Mayors score
1.3 points (0.68σ) higher than the average person, while MPs score 1.6 points (around
0.84σ) higher than the average person.
Earnings scores The bottom-left graph in Figure I displays the distributions of
the earnings score. The nominated display a small shift to the right – their mean
score is higher by 0.19σ. The elected show a clearer shift, with a 0.58σ difference.
The earnings score of mayors and MPs surpass that of the population by a full σ,
and 1.4σ, respectively.
10. Because of the large sample, all differences across groups reported in this subsection are
strongly statistically significant, with p-values below 0.001. A similar pattern holds in other sections
of the paper unless noted otherwise.
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The earnings score evidence is important for three reasons. First, it includes
both females and males. The strong positive selection is present for both genders
and, if anything, female politicians are more strongly selected than males, especially
at higher offices like mayor and MP (see Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix). Second,
strong positive selection on intelligence and leadership alone might just reflect a lower
opportunity cost for those who become politicians. But the opposite seems to be true:
politicians have higher earnings scores as well as actual (pre-office) earnings – see
Figure III below. Third, previous empirical work that proxies politician qualifications
through education reports high levels of achievement, at least for mayors and national
legislators, easily above the general population.11 But if access to higher education
merely reflects elite membership, then educational attainment becomes a poor marker
of positive political selection. Our earnings-score results show positive selection even
after conditioning on education level and sector of employment.
Education The distribution of education attainment over seven levels (in the bot-
tom right of Figure I) shows a similar pattern, with politicians under-represented at
the bottom levels, and over-represented at higher levels. As reported in Table I, the
nominated have one more year of education than the average Swede, while elected
politicians and mayors have roughly an additional year and a half. MPs have almost
three years of schooling above the population average. In the remainder of the paper,
we focus on the three non-education measures of competence.
The key takeaway from these graphs is a strong pattern of positive selection in
Swedish politics, which gets more positive at higher political ranks. This flies in the
face of the argument that the more competent are less likely to enter politics due to
higher opportunity costs, and shows that incompetent politicians are less common
as leadership positions become more important.
Politicians vs. high-status professions To gain an additional perspective on
selection, we also compare politicians to members of Swedish elite occupations known
for attracting talented people. Table II shows our competence measures, as well
as earnings, for the four categories of politicians, CEOs, lawyers, medical doctors,
and academic social scientists. The positive selection among CEOs increases with
company size. Elected politicians have cognitive and leadership scores similar to
CEOs with 10-25 employees, a group which is also comparable in size. Mayors have
11. See for example Ferraz and Finan (2009) on Brazilian mayors, Merlo et al. (2010), Galasso
and Nannicini (2011) and Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) on Italian legislators, Dal Bo´ and
Rossi (2011) on Argentine legislators, or Dal Bo´ et al. (2009) on U.S. legislators.
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exactly the same scores as CEOs in companies with 25-250 employees, even though
mayors earn substantially less. Parliamentarians have leadership and cognitive scores
in between CEOs in companies with 25-250 employees and those in companies above
250 employees. Lawyers and academic social scientists outscore CEOs and mayors
in terms of cognitive ability. Medical doctors – a highly prestigious profession in
Sweden associated with excellence – clearly show the highest cognitive scores of all.
Academic economists and political scientists have the most years of education, rank
second and third in cognitive scores, but have among the lowest leadership scores.
[Table 2 about here]
The patterns in the table make intuitive sense. Academics are smart, but lack
leadership, and as a result they accumulate the most years of education, but neither
lead organizations nor make life-or-death decisions. Mayors, MPs and CEOs are
marginally less smart, substantially less educated, but have higher leadership scores
and, fittingly, do lead public and private organizations.
Positive selection beneath the aggregate Although we find evidence of strong
positive selection in the aggregate, one may be concerned that this is an artifact
of the selection patterns of a few large municipalities. To examine this possibility,
we compare the traits of elected politicians to those of the average person in their
respective municipalities. Overall, few municipalities exhibit negative selection, and
the vast majority of municipalities select positively: 96 percent of municipalities on
the cognitive score, 86 percent on the leadership score, and more than 99 percent on
the earnings score. In Dal Bo´ et al. (2016), we provide a more detailed analysis of
the selection patterns across municipalities.
V. Social Representation
Section 4 showed a strong positive selection of politicians, and increasingly so at
higher political office. But this pattern could reflect very different selection regimes.
Perhaps Swedish politics is elitist rather than meritocratic, with heirs of rich families
getting privileged access to political power as well as to education and earning op-
portunities. Under such “elitism,” the competence of politicians is a side effect and
does not play a preeminent role in selection. Under the elitist regime, elite member-
ship by itself (due to wealth or connections, for example) determines selection. The
empirical implication (i) is that, conditional on elite status, individual ability should
matter little for selection. Alternatively, under “exclusive meritocracy,” those from
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more advantaged social classes still acquire stronger abilities, but it is those abilities
rather than privilege that helps them enter politics. This regime is compatible with
individual ability shaping selection, but it also implies (ii) that social background is
strongly associated with selection.
In this section we establish that Swedish reality is better described by a third
regime: “inclusive meritocracy.” In this account positive selection on competence
goes together with inclusive social representation. We establish the presence of in-
clusive meritocracy in two steps. In the next subsection we show the elitist account is
untenable; we falsify the above-mentioned empirical implication (i), by showing that
even when conditioning on family (and hence, social) background, individual ability
matters greatly for selection. In the following subsection V.B. we falsify empirical
implication (ii) by showing politicians represent all social backgrounds.
V.A. Elitism or meritocracy?
In this subsection we study political selection by holding constant the social
background of politicians. To do this, we compare the individual characteristics of
politicians not just against the population, but against their own siblings.
Politicians and their siblings Figure II compares the distribution of competence
traits of elected politicians with that of their siblings. To ease comparison with Figure
1, we also include the full population distribution. Clearly, elected politicians have
markedly higher cognitive and leadership scores than their siblings, as well as higher
earnings scores.
We can also compare the extent of selection between politicians and siblings to
that between politicians and the population. The difference vs. siblings for lead-
ership scores is equal to 78 percent of the gap vs. the population – for cognitive
and earnings scores, the respective numbers are 70 and 74 percent. These numbers
strongly indicate that ability, and not family background, is the key selection crite-
rion.12 A similar look at mayors and MPs in Figure II confirms that politicians at
higher levels are also drawn from a different ability distribution than their siblings.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure III further illustrates how individual traits beyond family background
shape political selection. It classifies politicians by their percentile in the income
12. Although politicians tend to be born first more often than their non-politician siblings, this
difference in birth order does not explain the pattern in Figure II. Our ability measures are only
marginally different for first-born versus later-born.
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distribution, compared to the population in their own birth cohort and gender. By
definition, the population would display a perfect uniform distribution with a density
of 0.05 for each 5-percentile bin. The left graph in each row shows that politicians
(elected, mayors and MPs) are disproportionately drawn from higher income per-
centiles. (Incidentally, but also importantly, this indicates that more able people
face higher opportunity costs from entering politics, which would encourage adverse
selection.) But the distribution in the right panel for politician siblings is much more
similar to the uniform population distribution.
[Figure 3 about here]
Overall, these patterns indicate that an individual’s own ability traits matter for
his/her political fortunes, and rule out the pure elitist account.
V.B. Inclusive meritocracy
Politicians and their parents Next, we directly examine the relevance of social
background, and show that it does not matter much for aggregate political selection.
Measuring social background by parental income and occupational status (see below),
we find that politicians do not come disproportionately from elites.13
For politicians in the most recent decade of our data, we find their parents’
incomes and occupations in the earliest year(s) of our data.14 We use the full
population data to allocate individuals into bins comprising five percentiles of the
annual-earnings distribution within each gender and birth year. We then compute
the proportion of fathers of politicians with 1979 incomes within each 5-percentile
bin.15 These proportions are shown in the top row of Figure IV. Recall from the
first column of Figure III that for politicians own incomes these distributions are
13. Summary statistics for parental incomes together with the four competence measures and the
measures of social class appear in the Online Appendix Table B.3.
14. As stated before, for politicians elected after 2000, we observe the father’s income in 1979 for
77 percent of the sample, and the mother’s income for 86 percent of the sample. For those elected
in 2010 we match over 90 percent of politicians. Since the match is less than perfect, one might be
concerned about sample selection bias. Compared to the matched politicians, the politicians whose
fathers’ 1979 income are missing tend to be slightly less competent, although only differences in
education levels and cognitive scores are statistically significant. It is reasonable to assume that
the fathers of these unmatched politicians came from lower social classes, since ability is largely
hereditary and positively correlated with social class. Then we are underestimating the share of
politicians that come from humbler origins, a bias which works against finding broad representation.
15. In the uncommon cases that a father has multiple children who become politicians, that
father’s observation is included as many times as offspring-politicians he produced.
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skewed to the right reflecting a striking over-representation of high earnings. But
for the same politicians’ fathers, the distribution has a much more uniform shape.
This is true especially among elected councilors, whose fathers are almost perfectly
representative of the population. (The corresponding figure for mothers’ earnings
can be found in the Online Appendix, Figure A.2.) A similar – albeit less perfect
– pattern of broad representation of parental backgrounds is present among mayors
and MPs.
[Figure 4 about here]
Politicians, CEOs, and medical doctors Again, it is valuable to compare politi-
cians with other elite professions. To do so, the bottom row of Figure IV repeats the
same exercise as in the top row, but for fathers of medical doctors (left graph) and
CEOs of firms with different size (two right-most graphs). These figures show that
the 1979 earnings for fathers of doctors and CEOs are much more skewed to the right
than the earnings for fathers of politicians, especially for doctors and large-company
managers. Naturally, the earnings of the doctors and CEOs themselves (not shown)
are also very much skewed to the right.
We can summarize the evidence from Figure IV in a different way. As measured
by intergenerational earnings, social mobility into a political career seems to be high
in absolute as well as relative terms, when compared to doctors and CEOs.
Politicians in different parties The evidence so far concerns elected politicians
from all parties. In Figure V, we replicate Figure IV for those elected to municipal
councils in the three largest parties, the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, and the
Center (agricultural) party. As the left column shows, politicians in all parties come
disproportionately from the top part of the income distribution, though more so in
the Conservatives than in the Social Democrats or the Center party. In the three right
graphs, however, we clearly see representation of different social backgrounds. High-
income earners are over-represented among the fathers of Conservatives and middle-
income earners among fathers of Social-Democrats. Finally, low-income earners are
overrepresented among fathers of Center-party politicians, who are often farmers (on
average, 40 percent as opposed to 5 percent in other parties) with relatively low
earnings.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figure V makes clear how parties represent different parts of the (parental) income
distribution. The aggregation of these diverging party representations renders the
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almost perfect representation of parental incomes in the top left panel of Figure IV
for all elected municipal politicians. Of course, this illustrates the presumption that
different parties represent different interests – at least in polities with a multi-party
system where the left-to-right dimension is important.
Social class While informative, parental income only captures one aspect of so-
cial status. Thus, we also consider data on parental social class as determined by
occupational status whenever this information is available. Figure A.3 in the On-
line Appendix compares distributions of social class for politician parents and the
population.16 That figure corroborates our previous finding: politicians are highly
representative of the population. The only notably over-represented social class is
farmers, which reflects the historical role of the Center party. We also see some
under-representation of skilled manual workers.
As argued earlier, if parental human-capital investments shape individual compe-
tence, a strictly meritocratic system might still favor elites. Meritocracy could then
favor the competent within a family, but still be elitist across families as per the
exclusive-meritocracy description. However, our finding that different social classes
are evenly represented rejects this interpretation. Instead, Sweden’s political system
is both meritocratic and broadly representative, as per the inclusive-meritocracy
description.
VI. Drivers of competence and representation
In this section we address potential drivers of Sweden’s inclusive meritocracy.
Two facts stand in the way of such a regime. First, (as we will document) ability
correlates positively with social class. Thus one might expect competence to be in
tension with inclusivity. Second, more able people have higher earnings and hence
face higher opportunity costs. This should make positive selection on competence
difficult in the first place. The first subsection examines whether there are signs
of a tradeoff between competence and inclusive social representation by examining
16. The class division corresponds closely to the EGP social-class scheme (Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992) which has been used by Lindgren et al. (2016) in their recent study of rep-
resentation in Sweden. We define six classes as: (1) non-skilled manual workers, (2) skilled manual
workers, (3) lower non-manual workers, (4) farmers, (5) intermediate non-manual workers, and (6)
higher non-manual workers. We are grateful to Martin Hallsten for sharing his STATA code with
us. We are forced to drop the category of “self-employed” because of data constraints. The data
are again from 1979, and 54 percent of the politicians nominated in 2010 have a father for which
we can define socioeconomic status.
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cross-sectional patterns of municipal politicians. The second subsection examines
patterns of selection by socioeconomic status in the aggregate. In that subsection we
explain why there is only a weak tradeoff between competence and inclusivity, and
why inclusive meritocracy is feasible. The third and fourth subsections answer the
question of how is positive selection on competence feasible in the first place, given
that the competent face higher opportunity costs.
VI.A. Is there a competence-representation tradeoff?
In order to characterize local selection and representation, we compare politicians
in each council to their municipal population according to a simple index. Let x
denote either a measure of competence or social class with K categories. We can
write this index as
Sx =
K∑
k=1
pk,ck −
K∑
k=1
pk,mk ,
where pk,c is the proportion of council members in each category k, and pk,m is the
corresponding proportion in the municipal population. The intuition is simple. If
the trait distribution in a municipality has support from 1 to 9 with a mean of 5, and
politicians are positively (negatively) selected on competence, their scores on average
are higher (lower) than 5, giving a positive (negative) selection index. Analogously
for the case of social class, when this index is zero for a municipality, all its social
classes are represented among politicians in proportion to their population prevalence
(or excess representation of lower classes balances out excess representation of higher
classes). We use this index to gauge municipal selection along each of our ability
variables – namely IQ, leadership, and earnings score – and social class variables -
standardized parental income or occupational status.
In Figure VI, we plot the relationship between competence and representation
for our various indices. We also include the corresponding regression line, and the
estimated slope coefficient for each of these six relationships. The estimated slopes
are all positive, suggesting a tradeoff.
[Figure 6 about here]
But the slope coefficients are small. For parental social class, the strongest rela-
tionship suggests that a 1σ higher over-representation of upper social classes is asso-
ciated with a 0.15σ higher cognitive score among elected municipal politicians. For
the two other competence measures, the relationships are much weaker. For parental
income, the strongest relationship suggests that a 1σ larger over-representation of
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high parental income is associated with a 0.15σ higher average earnings score. For
the cognitive and leadership scores, the estimates are of even smaller magnitudes
and not statistically significant.17 Overall, these correlations suggest a weak tradeoff
between competence and social background.
VI.B. Selection by socioeconomic background
The flat tradeoff between competence and social representation shown in the last
subsection may be surprising, given the problems to disentangle innate ability and
parental background. Despite Sweden’s comparatively uniform education system,
parental background likely shapes measured ability via socialization and home re-
sources. If (i) competence correlates positively with socioeconomic status, we should
observe a steep tradeoff unless (ii) stronger positive selection compensates for lower
averages in lower socioeconomic groups. To understand the flat tradeoff, and how
inclusive meritocracy is feasible, we investigate statements (i) and (ii) by parental
socioeconomic background.
Competence and socioeconomic status For each of our three ability measures,
Figure VII plots the average ability for both the population and each category of
politicians (nominated, elected, mayors, MPs) who belong in each quartile of the
parental income distribution. The plot suggests that condition (i) holds: there is
a positive relationship between parental economic background and ability in the
population. For example, among citizens with parents in the bottom income quartile,
average leadership scores are 5.1, versus 5.64 among those with parents in the top
income quartile, a difference of about 0.3σ. The analogous inter-quartile distances
for the cognitive and earnings scores are 0.45σ and 0.16σ, respectively.18
[Figure 7 about here]
Ability selection by parental background The main reason why inclusive mer-
itocracy is feasible, and why the tradeoff may appear flat, is that qualification (ii)
holds: positive selection on ability is stronger in lower social classes, which mitigates
17. Admittedly, measurement error could be attenuating these estimates. While this is a potential
concern, recall that we find support for an inclusive meritocracy even at the aggregate level.
18. The differences may be kept from becoming larger by the facts that the education system
in Sweden is entirely financed by the public sector, that admission to higher education is entirely
based on high-school grades, and that education traditionally has been provided in roughly equal
quality across the country.
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the ability cost of recruiting politicians from those classes. Consider cognitive scores:
politicians with fathers in the top income quartile outscore the general population
with fathers in the same quartile by 0.39σ. But elected councilors with fathers in the
bottom income quartile outscore the population with fathers in the same quartile by
0.50σ. Figure VII shows that this pattern is even more pronounced among mayors
and MPs. If a politician of humble origin makes it that high, then that politician is
very strongly selected. Online Appendix Figure A.4 shows similar patterns relying
on father’s occupational social class.
One striking aspect of these figures is the remarkable stability of positive selection
out of all father’s income levels and social classes. What defeats the tradeoff between
competence and inclusivity is the fact that every class has competent people, and
the strong positive selection washes out average ability differences.
VI.C. Individual self-selection
As shown before in Figure III, the competent face higher opportunity costs. How,
then, are the competent attracted into politics? One possibility is that in Sweden
pecuniary incentives do not matter. In this section, we further investigate the po-
tential drivers of political selection with the guidance of a simple model of pecuniary
and intrinsic incentives. The model and its predictions are presented in Section C of
the Online Appendix.
Material vs. intrinsic motives In our model, material motives make wages in
office, chances of accessing power, and age-earnings progression in a person’s occu-
pation relevant for selection. In the data, we indeed find evidence that material
incentives help shape self-selection. The competence of top politicians is higher in
municipalities with higher remunerations for mayors and vice-mayors, relative to
municipal average earnings (Online Appendix Figure A.5). Also, the competence of
top politicians is higher in parties with a higher probability of filling these full-time
political positions (Online Appendix Table B.4). Lastly, politicians with occupations
with steeper age-earnings profiles are less positively selected out of their own occu-
pation than politicians with flatter age-earnings profiles (Online Appendix Figure
A.6). This is not only consistent with the model’s notion of opportunity cost. To
the extent that the types of jobs held by parents and children are positively cor-
related, the finding also helps explain the better selection for politicians with low
socioeconomic backgrounds discussed in the previous subsection. All three findings
are consistent with material motives being relevant for political self-selection, which
then re-emphasizes the question: how are the competent attracted into politics?
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Full-time political positions are very well paid in Sweden, which appears relevant
given the evidence in Online Appendix Figure A.5. But politicians in local parties
with close to zero probabilities to land full-time political jobs are still considerably
smarter than the average citizens in the corresponding municipality (Online Ap-
pendix Table B.4). According to our simple model, this aspect of the data is only
consistent with strong intrinsic motives to serve in politics.
VI.D. Party Screening
The next step in the Swedish selection process is that parties screen those indi-
viduals who self-select into politics. One way parties do this is by observing their
members compete in coming up with good arguments and policy proposals. Such
competition may well result in positive selection if more able politicians win out in
the tournament and climb to the top of the party. Alternatively, party constituencies
(e.g., the youth branch, the female branch, associated unions, etc.) can select and
promote the more able to higher positions in the party list.
As mentioned in Section 2, qualitative work in political science suggests that
Swedish political parties actively screen and promote candidates. While we do not
strive to identify the exact mechanisms, we now present some quantitative evidence
that parties gradually promote the more competent to higher positions.
Selection and list rank We consider all party lists in all municipalities, and all
electoral periods within our sample. From these, we compute an ability index for all
candidates with a certain list rank, for each rank between 1 and 8. The left-column
graphs in Figure VIII show how ability varies by rank for the cognitive score, the
leadership score, and earnings score. Starting at the top (list rank 1), all measures
more or less steadily decline as we move down the list, with the clearest pattern for
the earnings score. In particular, the top-ranked politician has significantly higher
ability than every other rank for all three ability measures.
Parties thus seem to screen and promote more able people towards progressively
higher positions on their ballots. Given this positive screening, an improvement of
those who self-select into political service will typically translate into higher compe-
tence of elected politicians.
[Figure 8 about here]
The middle-column graphs show the promotion patterns by socioeconomic back-
ground. In particular, the black (gray) dots refer to politicians whose fathers’ incomes
were below (above) the median. If anything, the competence-promotion gradient is
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steeper for politicians from lower social classes. Thus it seems that party screening
is one of the mechanisms behind the broad representation we observe.
Finally, we might suspect that the motives for positive screening are stronger
with stiffer political competition as measured by electoral win margins. The right-
most graphs in Figure VIII suggest that positive party screening is indeed stronger
in municipalities with stiffer political competition (the gray dots).
All in all, healthy political parties – that can offer positive screening to society –
appear to be an important component of Sweden’s inclusive meritocracy in politics.
VII. Conclusion
Research in political economics offers theoretical arguments and empirical evi-
dence for the notion that leaders matter, and that societies benefit from an able
and broadly representative leadership. While democracy may be better suited than
other political systems to promote representation, it is not clear that it can deliver
both able and representative leadership. To shed light on this, we analyze political
selection in Sweden, a paradigmatic advanced democracy. We use rich information
on ability traits and social background for the universe of national and municipal
politicians and the entire Swedish population.
We uncover four facts. (1) Politicians are strongly positively selected for all ability
measures, despite their facing higher opportunity costs, with a monotonic relation
between ability and political power. (2) Positive selection is present even conditional
on social and family background: in other words, individual ability matters greatly
for selection. (3) Representation of social background, whether measured by parental
earnings or social class, is very even. (4) At most, there is a weak tradeoff in selection
between ability and inclusive social representation.
Democracy can thus promote competent leadership, which stems from inclusive
meritocracy, rather than from pure elitism or an exclusive meritocracy where the
privileged have an upper hand. In Sweden, political parties attract the competent and
promote the best to higher ranks, quite independently of social class. As a result, the
Swedish system produces plenty of well-selected politicians from low socioeconomic
backgrounds. While further research into this process is beyond the scope of our
study, a few elements appear to matter. One is a combination of well-paid full time
positions and strong intrinsic motivation to serve in uncompensated ones; another is
party governance in reasonable health working within an electoral system allowing
parties to represent various segments of society; and a third is availability of talent
across social classes (which may, in turn, reflect universal high-quality education).
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Although we cannot easily extrapolate to the rest of the world, our four facts al-
leviate concerns that political systems encouraging broad representation necessarily
select mediocre leaders. Some of the patterns we find may still be specific to Swedish
political (and societal) institutions. Data permitting, it would thus be very interest-
ing to carry out a comparative analysis of other countries with similar or dissimilar
political systems.
Our findings suggest that we may have to rethink models of political selection
and recruitment. Standard models, which focus on opportunity costs and material
motives for holding office, cannot explain positive selection of the type we uncover.
The data seem to support a richer view, where intrinsic as well as material motives
shape entry into politics, and where screening matters. Political parties play an
active role in screening candidates, and our results suggest that candidate ability is
an important element in this calculus.
Future work should extend the analysis in several dimensions. There is room for
more comprehensive modelling and testing of hypotheses on individual motives in
self-selection (the supply of politicians) and on the precise ways parties and voters
screen (the demand side). In addition, future research should attempt to quantify
intrinsic motivation, and its impacts on selection and performance. Finally, it would
be valuable to study how the competence and representativeness of political leaders
leave a mark on policy outcomes.
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VIII. Figures
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Figure I
Distribution of ability measures in the population and among politicians
Notes: The figure shows comparisons of the distribution of the ability variables among the Swedish
working-age population (18 or older) and four categories of politicians: nominated– but non-elected
– to a municipal council, elected to a municipal council, mayors, and members of parliament (MPs).
The two enlistment scores are shown in the top figures; the bottom left figure shows earnings score,
and the bottom right education level. Education level is coded into seven groups based on the
formal categorization of Statistics Sweden, namely less than 9 years, 9 years of primary education,
2-year secondary education, 3-year secondary education, tertiary education (less than three years),
tertiary education (at least three years) and research degree (licentiate or Ph.D.) All figures are
created with pooled individual level data for election years in the 1990s and 2000s (1991, 1994, 1998,
2002, 2006 and 2010). For the cognitive and leadership scores, the sample is restricted to men in
the 1951-1980 cohorts. Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we can reject that the distributions
are the same for each panel and for every pair of categories.
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Figure II
Distribution of ability measures among elected politicians, their siblings, and the
population
Notes: The figure compares the distributions of our ability variables for three categories of politi-
cians (elected to a municipal council, mayors, and members of parliament) and their siblings. The
two enlistment scores are shown in the first two columns, the earnings score in the third column.
Only politicians with at least one sibling are included. All figures are created with pooled individual
level data for election years in the 1990s and 2000s (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010). For
the cognitive and leadership scores, the sample is restricted to men in the 1951-1980 cohorts.
32
Figure III
Distribution of elected politicians and their siblings across the percentiles of population
income
Notes: The figure compares the distribution of annual labor incomes of three categories of politicians
(elected to a municipal council, mayors, and parliamentarians) to that of their respective siblings.
Data from the years 2003, 2007 and 2011 for the adult population (18 or older) was used to compute
the percentiles of annual earnings in the population. The proportion of individuals who fall into
each 5-percentile bracket is shown in the histograms. The income percentiles are calculated by birth
year and gender. Only politicians with at least one sibling are included.
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Figure IV
Distribution of fathers of politicians and other occupations across the percentiles of
population income
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of income among fathers to three types of politicians
(elected to a municipal council, mayors, and parliamentarians) and three types of other elite occu-
pations (doctors and CEOs of small or medium, and large enterprises) in 2003, 2007 and 2011. The
proportion of fathers who fall into each 5-percentile bracket is shown in the histograms. The income
percentiles are calculated by birth year and gender. Data from year 1979 were used to compute the
percentiles of annual earnings for the fathers. Fathers are only included if they are of adult age in
year 1979 (18 or older), and politicians are only included if we can find an earnings observation for
their father in that year. A father’s observation is included as many times as offspring-politicians
he produced.
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Figure V
Distribution of elected politicians and their fathers across the percentiles of population
income, by party
Notes: The figure shows distributions of elected politicians (left) and their fathers (right) across the
percentiles of the Swedish income distribution. The income percentiles are calculated by birth year
and gender. The top (middle/bottom) figure includes politicians elected to a municipal assembly
seat for the Social Democrats (Conservative/Center) party. See the notes for Figure 4 for details
on the data used.
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Figure VI
Correlations between municipal indices of representation and selection
Notes: The figure shows the relationships between competence selection indices (y-axis) and repre-
sentation indices (x-axis). The representation index is the average among politicians’ father minus
the average of the fathers of the adult population (18 or older) in the same municipality. Social class
of the father in the left column of graphs is measured through father’s occupational status, and in
the right column through father’s income. Father’s income is measured by the income percentile in
1979, by birth year. Social class is measured in 1980 and is given the values 1-6 as: (1) Non-skilled
manual; (2) Skilled manual; (3) Lower non-manual; (4) Farmer; (5) Intermediary non-manual; and
(6) Higher non-manual. The unit of observation is the municipality and election period. Each dot
in the scatter-plots corresponds to the binned average among 50 municipality-election observations.
Bins are defined over the support of the x-variable to yield the equal 50-observation split. The
regression line shows the estimated slope coefficient from an OLS regression of the selection index
on the representation index. The slope coefficient is displayed below each graph. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses, and beta is the normalized relationship in terms of standard errors.
The data include all elections from 1998-2010. For the leadership and cognitive scores, data is
restricted to men in the 1951-1980 cohorts.
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Figure VII
Average ability measures for politicians and general population by father’s income
quartile
Notes: The figure shows average ability for four types of politicians (nominated – but not elected
– to a municipal council, elected to a municipal council, mayors, and parliamentarians) and the
working-age population, by income quartile of each individual’s father (x-axis), measured in the
year 1980. The data are pooled for all politicians elected in the 2000s (2002, 2006 and 2010), and
the general population is also sampled in these same years. For the cognitive and leadership scores,
the sample is restricted to men in the 1951-1980 cohorts.
37
Figure VIII
Average ability by party list rank, divided by parental social background and municipal
political competition.
Notes: The figure shows the averages of three ability variables by ballot rank. The top (mid-
dle/bottom) graph shows the means for leadership score (cognitive score/residual earnings mea-
sure). The data come from elections held during 1991-2010 (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and
2010). In the left column of plots, the black dots show the mean of the competence variable for the
politicians in each ballot rank, and the vertical lines running through each dot denote 95% confi-
dence intervals. In the middle column of plots, similar means and confidence intervals are shown,
but the politician observations are split by whether their fathers have incomes below or above the
median father in the population. The black dots show the summary statistics for the politicians
with low-income fathers, and the gray dots show the statistics for the politicians with high-income
fathers. In the right column of plots, similar means and confidence intervals are reported for two
groups of municipality-election observations, split by the median of political competition. Political
competition is computed as the win margin of the majority bloc of parties, left or center-right.
The black dots show the summary statistics for the politicians in low-competition contexts, and
the gray dots show the statistics for the politicians in high-competition contexts. For the cognitive
and leadership scores, the sample is restricted to men in the 1951-1980 cohorts.
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IX. Tables
TABLE I
Summary statistics for the population and politicians
Population Politicians
Mean Std. Dev. Nominated Elected Mayors MPs
Women 51.0 50.0 39.9 40.8 24.9 42.2
Age 48.4 18.9 50.3 50.8 52.5 49.6
Foreign born (%) 13.7 34.4 7.4 5.8 2.6 4.1
Leadership score (1-9) 5.3 1.7 5.6 5.9 6.5 6.8
Cognitive score (1-9) 5.1 1.9 5.6 6.0 6.4 6.7
Years of education 11.7 3.0 12.8 13.1 13.2 14.5
Earnings score (z-score) 0.05 0.94 0.18 0.55 0.97 1.33
Observations (*) 42,096,789 236,950 79,463 1,569 2,086
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on social attributes and on the various measures of competence. These
statistics were computed for the Swedish working-age population (18 or older), and for politicians, pooling individual
level data for election years in the 1990s and 2000s (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010). Politicians are divided
into four hierarchical categories: nominated (but not elected) for a municipal assembly seat, elected for a municipal as-
sembly seat, mayor, and member of (national) parliament. (*) Observations reports the highest number of individual
observations used in the column. For the enlistment measures of ability, only male politicians in the 1951-1980 cohorts
are included, which gives a smaller number of observations for these measures. A politician is included once for each
election period in which he/she serves, so the Observations number is larger than the number of unique individuals.
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TABLE II
Ability by selected elite occupations
Leadership Cognitive Earnings Years of Labor
score score score schooling earnings Obs
Nominated to mun. council 5.5 5.5 0.07 13.6 286.2 24535
Municipal councilors 5.8 5.9 0.38 13.8 379.0 8870
Mayors 6.4 6.2 0.79 13.9 679.4 247
Parliamentarians 6.6 6.4 0.98 14.8 802.2 320(*)
CEOs (10− 24 employees) 6.1 5.8 0.81 13.6 675.6 6825
CEOs (25− 249 employees) 6.4 6.2 1.12 14.2 1046.2 6885
CEOs (≥ 250 employees) 6.8 6.7 1.29 15.4 1926.0 1470
Medical Doctors 6.5 7.4 1.13 17.1 640.0 29514
Lawyers and Judges 6.5 6.8 0.69 17.0 568.0 5308
Economists 5.9 7.0 0.38 20.4 530 248
Political Scientists 5.8 6.8 0.61 20.4 513.3 306
Notes: The table shows ability averages among politicians (nominated but not elected in row 1, elected municipal councilors in
row 2, mayors in row 3, and parliamentarians in row 4) and among individuals in seven occupational categories, which make up
other “elite” occupations in Swedish society. Columns 1 and 2 report the means for the two enlistment scores, the leadership
score and the cognitive score (measured on a 1-9 scale). Column 3 reports the means of our earnings score, and column 4 reports
average years of education. Column 5 reports the mean of annual labor earnings (in 1000s Swedish Kronor; 1 SEK 0.8USD), and
finally, column 6 reports the number of individuals classified into each elite occupation. The data are from 2011 and includes the
full Swedish working-age population (18-65). Individuals working in universities are identified based on a 5-digit industry code
that indicates employment at a university. For the cognitive score and the leadership score, data is restricted to men in the 1951-
1980 cohorts. (*) Removing individuals older than 65 reduces the number of parliamentarians below the full size of parliament.
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Online Appendix to “Who
Becomes a Politician?”:
Supplementary Analysis, Figures
and Tables
This Online Appendix includes additional figures in Section A and additional
tables in Section B. Section C offers an analysis of self-selection decisions and party
screening, by first laying out a formal model and then taking its predictions to the
data.
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A Figures
Figure A.1
Distribution of earnings score in the population and among politicians, by gender
Notes: The figure shows comparisons of the distribution of the earnings score among the Swedish
working-age population (18-72) and four categories of politicians: nominated (but non-elected) to
a municipal council, elected to a municipal council, mayors, and members of parliament, by gender.
The figures are created with pooled individual level data for election years in the 1990s and 2000s
(1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010).
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Figure A.2
Distribution across the percentiles of population income of mothers of elected politicians,
mayors, parliamentarians, doctors and CEOs
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of income among mothers to three types of politicians
(elected to a municipal council, mayors, and parliamentarians) and three types of other elite oc-
cupations (doctors and CEOs of small or medium, and large enterprises) in 2003, 2007 and 2011.
The proportion of individuals who fall into each 5-percentile bracket is shown in the histograms.
The income percentiles are calculated by birth year and gender. Data from year 1979 were used to
compute the percentiles of annual earnings for the mothers. Mothers are only included if they are
of adult age in year 1979 (18-or older), and politicians are only included if we can find an earnings
observation for their mother in that year.
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Figure A.3
Distribution of 2010 politicians’ parental social class, measured in 1980 and compared to
the 2010 populations social class.
Notes: The figure shows the distributions across six social classes of politicians elected to municipal
council (light gray bars) and their parents (dark gray bars). The height of the bars show the
proportion of individuals in each social class. Elected politicians are measured in year 2010. Parents’
social class is measured in 1980. Only politicians for whom we can identify a father or a mother
with a non-missing social class are included. In cases where we can identify the social class of both
parents, only the one with the highest social class is included in the figure.
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Figure A.4
Distribution of 2010 politician parental social class, measured in 1980 and compared to
the 2010 population parental social class.
Notes: The figure shows the distributions across six social classes of parents of four categories
of politicians (running in 2010, solid bars) and parents of individuals in the general population
(transparent bars). The height of the bars shows the proportion of parents in each occupational
social class. Parents’ social class is measured in 1980. Only politicians for whom we can identify a
father or a mother with a non-missing social class are included. In cases where we can identify the
social class of both parents, only the one with the highest social class is included in the figure. The
class division corresponds closely to the EGP social-class scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992).
We define six classes as: (1) non-skilled manual workers, (2) skilled manual workers, (3) lower
non-manual workers, (4) farmers, (5) intermediate non-manual workers, and (6) higher non-manual
workers.
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Figure A.5
Estimated bivariate relationships between politician ability and the mayor’s wage relative
to the municipal population, by electoral ballot rank
Notes: The figure shows estimation results for the relationship between politician ability and the
mayor’s annual earnings as a fraction of the average annual earnings in the municipality that he
or she governs. Bivariate OLS regressions are run in sub-samples based on electoral ballot rank.
These sub-samples are denoted on the x-axis. In the left graph, the cognitive score (black color) and
the leadership score (gray color) are each used as the dependent variable. In the right graph, the
dependent variable is the earnings score measure. The dots represent the size of the point estimates
and the vertical lines 95% confidence intervals. Data is extracted for the election years in the 1990s
and 2000s (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010). For the enlistment scores, we only use data
for men in the 1951-1980 cohorts.
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Figure A.6
Selection by ability and politician sector of work
Notes: The figure shows the relationship between the ability selection indices and the age-earnings
profile of various occupation types. The x-axis of the plots in the left (right) column shows the
average increase in annual earnings, in 1000 SEK, by education orientation (industry sector) –
dividing individuals in two groups, with and without tertiary education–, while the y-axis shows the
selection indices by education (sector). Each selection index is computed as mean ability among the
elected municipal politicians for each occupation minus mean ability among non-politicians in the
same occupation in the working-age population (18-72). Average earnings increases are computed
from annual individual-level data for the Swedish working-age population (1990-2012). Individuals
with the same occupation are divided into age brackets of five years and year-on-year average
earnings hikes are computed for the entire period as earnings(t+1)-earnings(t). The regression
lines are estimated by OLS. The cognitive and leadership scores are restricted to 1951-1980 cohort
men.
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B Tables
TABLE B.1
Correspondence between the sub-traits of the leadership score and the
Big 5 personality traits
Corresponding
Sub-trait Details of component Big 5 trait
Social Maturity
Extraversion Extraversion
Having friends Extraversion
Taking responsibility Conscientiousness
Independence Openness
Psychological Energy
Perseverance Conscientiousness
Ability to fulfill plans Conscientiousness
Ability to remain focused Conscientiousness
Intensity
Capacity to generate initiative Conscientiousness
without external pressure
Intensity and frequency Openness
of free time activities
Emotional Stability
Disposition to Anxiety Neuroticism
Ability to control and channel nervousness Neuroticism
Tolerance of stress Neuroticism
Notes: The Swedish enlistment procedure assesses conscripts’ psychological traits and combines them into a “Lead-
ership Score.” The manual followed by the trained psychologist to make this assessment specifies a process that
first scores the conscript on four sub-traits, listed in column 1 of the table, and then merges these assessments into
a final score. The sub-traits capture certain aspects of the conscript’s personality, which are listed in column 2. In
column 3, these personality aspects are related to their corresponding “Big Five” personality characteristics (see
Nilsson (2014)).
8
TABLE B.2
Correlations between ability measures, 2011
Leadership score Cognitive score Years of education
Leadership score 1
Cognitive score 0.338 1
Years of education 0.300 0.511 1
Earnings Score 0.201 0.167 0.076
Notes: This table reports bivariate correlation coefficients between the various measures of ability. The
underlying data encompass the Swedish working age population (18-72) in 2011. For the cognitive and
leadership scores, the sample is restricted to men in the 1951-1980 cohorts.
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TABLE B.3
Summary statistics for the population and politicians with additional
variables
Population Politicians
Mean Std. Dev. Nominated Elected Mayors MPs
Women 51 50 39.9 40.8 24.9 42.2
Age 48.4 18.9 50.3 50.8 52.5 49.6
Foreign born (%) 13.7 34.4 7.4 5.8 2.6 4.1
Leadership score (1-9) 5.3 1.7 5.6 5.9 6.5 6.8
Cognitive score (1-9) 5.1 1.9 5.6 6 6.4 6.7
Years of education 11.7 3 12.8 13.1 13.2 14.5
Earnings Score (z-score) 0.05 0.94 0.18 0.55 0.97 1.33
Fathers inc perc. (1979) 51.7 28.9 49.6 51.3 51.7 59.9
Mothers inc perc. (1979) 46.9 28.5 45.9 47.2 47.2 50.8
Fathers SEI =1 (1980) 0.23 0.42 0.2 0.2 0.17 0.13
Fathers SEI =2 (1980) 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.18
Fathers SEI =3 (1980) 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
Fathers SEI =4 (1980) 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.07
Fathers SEI =5 (1980) 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23
Fathers SEI =6 (1980) 0.1 0.3 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.24
Observations 42,096,789 236,950 79,463 1,569 2,086
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on social attributes and on the various measures of competence. These
statistics were computed for the Swedish working-age population (18 or older), and for politicians, pooling individual level
data for election years in the 1990s and 2000s (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010). A politician is included once for
each election period in which he/she serves. For the cognitive and leadership scores, the sample is restricted to men in
the 1951-1980 cohorts. Politicians are divided into four hierarchical categories: nominated (but not elected) to municipal
council, elected to municipal council, mayor, and member of (national) parliament.(*) Observations reports the highest
number of individual observations used in the column. For the enlistment measures of ability, only male politicians in the
1951-1980 cohorts are included, which gives a smaller number of observations for these measures. A politician is included
once for each election period in which he/she serves, so the Observations number is larger than the number of unique
individuals.
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TABLE B.4
Average ability selection indices of elected politicians and top-ranked
politicians on local parties’ electoral ballots, by party-internal career
prospects
Probability that the politician’s party appoints the mayor
0% 1-50% 51-99% 100%
Elected Top Elected Top Elected Top Elected Top
Leadership Score 0.75 0.95 0.94 1.25 0.79 1.11 0.65 1.52
Cognitive Score 1.29 1.42 1.15 1.37 1.03 1.41 0.90 1.92
Earnings Score 0.35 0.51 0.51 0.79 0.58 0.88 0.60 1.13
Observations (*) 5,394 1,584 1,032 456
Notes: The table shows the means of three ability variables by the probability that the politician’s party ap-
points the mayor in his/her municipality. We measure this probability for each municipality as the proportion
of election periods that a party was responsible for appointing the mayor between 1982 and 2010 in that mu-
nicipality. The means of the leadership score are shown in row 1, the means of the cognitive score in row 2,
and the mean of the earnings score in row 3. Row 4 shows the number of local party-election period observa-
tions in each category. Data are drawn from the election years in the 1990s and 2000s (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002,
2006, and 2010). (*) For the enlistment measures of ability, only male politicians in the 1951-1980 cohorts are
included, which gives a smaller number of observations for these measures.
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C Self-selection into politics and party
screening
In the main text of the paper, we have shown that Swedish democracy attracts
highly competent individuals even though they clearly have higher opportunity costs
from participating in politics. How is this possible? It may be argued that municipal
councilors, as part-time politicians, do not face a strong opportunity cost. But we
have shown that full-time politicians such as mayors and MPs are also positively
selected, despite high pre-office earnings, so the puzzle remains. One explanation is
that Swedes are oblivious to pecuniary incentives and opportunity costs – but this
seems extreme (and ultimately testable). A less extreme explanation is that material
incentives overcome opportunity costs, or that they are aided by intrinsic motivation.
Here, we try to make at least some progress on this puzzle. Three different sets of
actors shape the characteristics of the Swedish political class. One is political parties,
who have their own objectives and governance structures, which we have discussed
in the main text. Another is individuals themselves, who voluntarily give their time
to participate in politics. In this section, we analyze the individual incentives to
self-select into politics and how self-selection translates into equilibrium (observed)
selection under plausible assumptions about party screening. We do not explicitly
consider individuals in their role as voters.
CA. Model of self selection
Main ideas We write down and analyze a simple “Roy model” to shed light on
self-selection into politics and on party screening. The model features two periods:
individuals decide whether to enter into politics in the first period when “young.”
The basics of the model track the reality of municipal politics in Sweden: since
politics is a part-time occupation, entering politics does not entail leaving one’s
private occupation when young.
However, those who ascend to higher political ranks (such as mayor or MP)
when “old,” have to abandon their private occupations, which imposes an oppor-
tunity cost. Promotion is probabilistic and the opportunity cost is (for some, only
partly) compensated by an attractive wage. Moreover, private occupations become
more attractive over time – as compensation when old incorporates a seniority pre-
mium, which is occupation-specific (e.g., higher in finance than in elementary-school
teaching). While participation in politics when young does not impose an opportu-
nity cost right then, for those who do not obtain the promotion to senior political
ranks there is a cost later: due to their split attention while young, those who enter
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politics get lower private seniority premia when old. Individuals differ in terms of
their ability – which determines their private occupation payoff – and their intrinsic
motivation – modeled as a utility kick from spending time in politics.
Whether an individual who self selects into politics also gets an electable position
on the ballot depends on screening by her party. We consider different types of
screening, but the results presented in the main text strongly suggest that parties
screen positively on competence.
Supply side Consider a set of risk-neutral people, who have to decide whether to
supply their services as leisure politicians. Each person is drawn from a continuous
distribution jointly defined over two parameters: ability index Y with typical element
y, and an index of intrinsic motives to serve P with typical element p. We assume
these parameters are independent, with P ∈ [0, P¯ > 0] uniformly distributed and
Y ∈ [0,∞) distributed according to c.d.f. G (y) with density g (y).
Each person has a two-period horizon and there is no discounting. For simplicity,
we assume that going into politics is a once-and-for-all choice in period 1.1 Whoever
does not go into politics earns y in the first period and expects to earn γy ≥ y in the
second. In other words, γ ≥ 1 is a measure of the seniority premium (in the data, γ
is proxied by the earnings-age profile and is allowed to vary across occupations).2
Someone who offers to serve gets accepted to run and is elected to the municipal
council with probability q(y) – we consider different slopes of the screening function
q (y) when discussing the demand side. Elected politicians get intrinsic benefits p
2
in each of the two periods.3 They must also give up some career: period-1 private
earnings are y, but period-2 expected earnings are (1− δ)γy, where δ ∈ [0, 1] shapes
the future opportunity cost of current political involvement. The opportunity cost of
politics is thus δγy, which depends on general ability, private-career prospects, and
how these are damaged by a political career.
Some first-period council members are appointed mayors in the second period, in
1. At the cost of additional complexity, the model can be extended to include discounting as
well as sequential decisions: a person who entered in period 1 can decide whether to stay or leave
in period 2. Discounting adds notational complication only, while sequential decisions create more
complex selection patterns which converge to those presented here as the parameter δ (to be defined
shortly) goes to 1.
2. This model of the supply side is related to those in Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), Francois
(2000) and Dal Bo´ et al. (2013), but among other differences it considers the distinct case of
“leisure” politicians who do not give up immediate private sector earnings when entering public
service, as well as the role of the seniority premium γ.
3. This benefit also captures non-pecuniary, but arguably somewhat extrinsic, returns such as
gains in social status.
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which case they earn a political wage w < Y plus the intrinsic benefit p
2
. This happens
with probability pi (in the data, we will allow w and pi to differ by municipality and
party).
Cost-benefit calculation A person decides to become a politician when young
whenever
(1 + γ)y ≤ (1− q(y))(1 + γ)y + q(y)((1 + (1− pi)(1− δ)γ)y + piw) + q(y)p.
After some algebra, this condition simplifies to
p+ pi(w − (1− δ)γy) ≥ δγy.
The intrinsic return to politics (the 1st term on the LHS) plus the probability of an
income gain when becoming mayor (the 2nd term on the LHS) has to outweigh the
opportunity cost of lost career prospects (the RHS).
The entry condition can be re-written as
p ≥ p(y) ≡ pi((1− δ)γy − w) + δγy. (2)
Any type (y, p) on the “selection line” p(y) is indifferent between entering politics
and staying out. Those above (below) this line want to enter (stay out).
Comparative statics From the selection line defined in (2), we can derive the
effect of a change in w as
dp (y)
dw
= −pi < 0,
meaning that the selection line shifts down and the set of those willing to enter gets
larger. As we prove (in the Appendix), independent traits and a uniform distribution
over P imply that average ability must go up with any parametric change that shifts
the selection line down in parallel fashion.
For parameter pi, we get
dp (y)
dpi
= (1− δ) γy − w,
which in general is ambiguous in sign. Here, the selection line pivots. As ability
goes to zero, the derivative approaches −w, meaning that the line shifts down. But
for very able types, it is positive if δ is low enough, and the selection line shifts up.
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Then, a higher pi could conceivably reduce supply of high-ability types. But the data
tell a different story, which can only be the case if δ is high enough that the line
shifts down for all types (for any finite y, there exists δ close enough to 1 to render
dp(y)
dpi
unambiguously negative).
Finally, for parameter γ, (2) implies that
dp (y)
dγ
= (pi + δ (1− pi)) y > 0,
meaning a steeper age-earnings profile shifts the line up. This discourages entry,
lowers average ability, and thus makes for worse supply.
We can summarize the comparative statics in the following (proof in the Ap-
pendix):
Proposition 1 Suppose (p, y) are drawn from an independent distribution with P
uniformly distributed on
[
0, P¯ > 0
]
and Y distributed on [0,∞) according to G (y) .
Then, maximum as well as average competence of people self-selecting into politics
increase (weakly) with higher w and lower γ, and with higher pi (if δ is high enough).
Demand side Consider the three types of screening: (i) random selection (e.g.,
Athenian democracy, with election probability q unrelated to y); (ii) negative selec-
tion (e.g., cronyism, with q′ (y) < 0); and (iii) positive selection (i.e., meritocracy,
with q′ (y) > 0).
Since Sweden is a party-based democracy, we assume that a party planner selects
from the available candidate pool, anticipating voter demands. The main question
is whether our earlier finding that elected politicians have higher ability than the
average citizen means that parties screen in a positive way.
The answer is in the affirmative (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 2 If the party has sufficiently good information on those who supply
their services, the fact that elected politicians are more competent than the average
citizen implies positive screening by parties. Then, the results in Proposition 1 extend
to equilibrium outcomes.
To see this, note first that the term q (y) does not affect the cost-benefit calculus
of individuals. Since entry is invariant to party screening, we only need to keep
track of the entry condition to characterize the candidate pool. Suppose the planner
observes candidate types (y, p) perfectly. We can then show that both random and
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negative screening must lead to politicians less competent than the average citizen,
leaving positive screening as the only remaining alternative.4
Consider random selection. Given selection line p = pi((1− δ)γy −w) + δγy, the
relatively competent self-select out of politics, and expected candidate ability (denote
it E(yA)) must be worse than the average ability E(y) in the population. A bit more
formally (and abstracting from the fact that γ ≥ 1), note that the entry condition
implies p(y) → −piw if γ → 0, such that all citizens enter and E(yA) → E(y). But
as shown above, E(yA) decreases in γ. This means that when we raise γ away from
zero, E(yA) must dip below E(y).
As random screening implies that the average quality of selected politicians is
worse than that of the population, the result for negative screening follows immedi-
ately.
Because of positive screening, our comparative statics of supply apply to those
who are selected into parties and elected. This is easy to see if the party observes
types (p, y) perfectly.5 Any party that values competence will select individuals
with the highest available ability, i.e., those with type
(
P¯ , P¯+wpi
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ
)
. Thus, any
change in (γ, pi, w) that shifts the line down will (weakly) increase the average and
top quality not just among those willing to enter, but also among those elected.
Thus, the competence of politicians is weakly increasing in w and pi (when δ is high
enough), and weakly decreasing in γ.
Summary Our simple model of supply and its comparative statics resonate with
the economic models of selection into politics discussed in the introduction to the
main paper, in that they point to clear material motives and opportunity costs
as important drivers of self-selection. In addition, our model highlights intrinsic
motives, dynamic career concerns, and helps think about how, given self-selection,
screening would affect final selection.
CB. Evidence on Self-selection
In this subsection, we check whether the patterns in the data are consistent with
the predictions of our model.
4. While our conclusion of positive screening relies on the assumptions of our model, specifically
the one on the distribution of traits, it is corroborated by evidence presented in the paper on the
screening role of parties.
5. The argument can be extended to the case when the party observes types imperfectly at the
cost of some additional notation and algebra.
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Mayor earnings One prediction is that higher monetary remuneration (w in the
model) attracts more competent politicians. To explore this, we look at the salary of
mayors, the only (or one of few) full-time paid position(s).6 Mayor salaries vary sub-
stantially across municipalities. In 2011, their average annual earnings was 632,400
SEK (about 79,044 USD), with a standard deviation of 213,000 SEK.
To relate the value of this wage to income opportunities in the municipality, we
normalize the mayor’s annual earnings by average earnings among all inhabitants
above 18 years of age. This approximates the material payoff to the position of
mayor.
We consider a sample of all local parties that ever appointed a mayor in the
period 1991-2010. Because the probability of becoming mayor varies by rank on the
municipal party list – first-ranked politicians being (overwhelmingly) the most likely,
second-ranked being next in line, and so on – we select the top-five people from every
electoral ballot and create five samples, one for each list rank.
Then, we use OLS to estimate
Qi,r,m,t = αt + βrwm,t + εi,r,t, (3)
where Qi,r,m,t is one of our three ability measures for politician i with list rank r,
in municipality m in election period t, αt is an election-period fixed effect, and wm,t
is the (normalized) mayoral wage in municipality m and election period t. The
coefficient of interest is βr, the linear relation between the mayor’s relative wage
and the selection of politicians for rank r. If a higher salary attracts higher-ability
individuals, βr should be positive. Moreover, if high earnings attract high-ability
candidates to seek positions with a higher probability to become mayor, βr should
be the highest for r = 1.
The estimates for the cognitive and leadership scores show a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between mayoral wage and selection into the top rank of the
list (from which mayors are almost exclusively appointed). A 1σ increase in rela-
tive mayoral wages is associated with a higher leadership score of individuals in the
top rank (averaging out across parties) by 0.28σ, and a higher cognitive score by
0.19σ.When restricting attention to leadership and cognitive scores, we do not see
evidence of positive effects for the remaining ranks. The estimates for earnings score
are positive and significant for ranks 1, 2, and 4. The largest point estimate is for
the top rank, which shows that a 1σ higher relative mayoral wages is associated with
6. We could also add the prospects of a promotion to a position in the national parliament.
Because the probability of this event is so low (on the order of 0.5%), this would not change any of
the results to be shown here.
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an higher earnings score by 0.19σ. Figure A.5 in this Online Appendix plots our
estimate of interest from equation (3), from our five r-samples. These correlations
lend some support to the idea from the model that stronger pecuniary prospects in
politics, in the form of a higher mayor’s wage, tend to draw more able candidates.
Age-earnings profiles Another prediction from our simple model is that selection
is less positive for people with a higher seniority premium (γ in the model). We
capture this premium by computing occupation-specific age-earnings profiles, in two
ways. One builds on a categorization of easily identifiable education types, which
cover roughly 70 percent of the working-age population. The other way builds on
sectors of employment, the same sectors that go into the estimation of the Mincer
equation in (1) in Section 3 of the main text and underlying our measure of earnings
score. As in that estimation, we divide people in each sector into two groups, one with
tertiary education and one without. This categorization covers the whole working-
age population, but does not lend itself to as easy labeling as the first method.
For each labor-market segment and each classification, we first compute the av-
erage rate of (nominal) earnings growth over the course of the sample. Then, we
compute separate selection indices, like that in section VI.A. in the main text, for
our three ability measures in each occupation. Finally, we regress these selection
indices on the age-earnings profile in each occupation. Thus, we run six regressions
(three ability measures × two types of occupation classification). We find that in
five of the six regressions individuals are significantly less positively selected when
they belong to occupational categories with more rapidly rising earnings. In fact, a
few occupations with very rapidly increasing earnings display negative selection.
Figure A.6 in this Online Appendix graphs the data in each regression, where
each row of plots shows a specific ability selection index – from top to bottom, the
leadership score, the cognitive score, and earnings score. The columns apply to an
occupation division: educational categories to the left and employment sectors to
the right. Overall, this exercise yields substantial support to one of the less direct
predictions of the model.
Appointment probabilities The remaining prediction concerns the effect of prospects
for political promotion (pi in the model). The probability of landing a paid political
position like the mayorship varies markedly with the political status of the party.
Some parties are in a strong majority position, making their appointing the mayor
highly probable. Other parties are small in size and/or belong to the opposition
bloc, making their appointing the mayor highly unlikely. We thus classify parties
into categories depending on the opportunity they afford in terms of political career
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in each municipality.
To do that, for each party and municipality, we simply calculate the proportion
of election periods between 1982 and 2010 that the party appointed the mayor.
Specifically, to proxy for parameter pi, we divide parties into four groups: (1) 0
percent probability, (2) l-50 percent probability, (3) 51-99 percent probability, and
(4) 100 percent probability.
We compare competence selection indices across these four categories. We want
to know: (i) Does type (4), with the highest probability of appointing the mayor,
stand out in terms of positive selection? and (ii) Do parties of other types, especially
type (1), still show positive selection of politicians?
Table B.4 in this Online Appendix shows selection indices for each of the groups
(1)-(4). We find that parties that are sure to appoint the mayor indeed have a better
selection of their top-ranked politicians.7 Hence, the political career prospects do
seem to matter for positive selection, as our model suggests. This result is in sync
with the result on mayoral wages.
In addition, we find no evidence of adverse (or even neutral) selection for the
rank and file in parties with a small or zero probability of promotion. The average
representative is as qualified in the party category with the weakest career prospects
as in the party categories with better prospects. In terms of our model, this suggests
that material motives tell only part of the self-selection story and that intrinsic
motives must also play an important role (in our model, individuals with p = 0
would not enter politics if they stood no chance to obtain a prized mayoral position).
Bottom line Our simple model establishes that if screening is either neutral or
positive (a “well behaved” demand side), the predictions of our self-selection model
(the supply side of politics) will translate into patterns of selection observed in equi-
librium. The findings in the main text do support the notion that screening is
positive. In addition, the predictions on self-selection derived here are also broadly
consistent with the data. Our findings suggest that both material and intrinsic mo-
tives matter in political entry. Material motives appear to matter in terms of direct
compensation, as this is relevant to outweigh opportunity costs in an intuitive way.
Moreover, less intuitive effects highlighted by the model are also consistent with the
data, such as those stemming from a dynamic opportunity cost created by different
age-wage profiles across occupations.
7. Majority parties have larger party delegations on average, which means that the average
competence among the rank and file is pulled down by moving further down the competence dis-
tribution.
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CC. Appendix – proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The set of willing politicians, the “applicant pool”, is
(y, p) |p ≥ (pi(1− δ) + δ) γy − piw or y ≤ p+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ .
The measure of the applicant pool is,∫ P¯
0
∫ p+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ
0
g(y)dy
1
P¯
dp
and the average quality in the applicant pool (denoted by E (yA)) is,
E (yA) =
∫ P¯
0
∫ p+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ
0 yg(y)dy
1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
∫ p+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ
0 g(y)dy
1
P¯
dp
.
Denote ϕ ≡ p+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ ≡ p+aψ , with a ≡ piw and ψ ≡ (pi(1− δ) + δ) γ.
Maximum competence The most competent type willing to enter politics is(
P¯ , y¯ ≡ P¯+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ
)
. Note that dy¯
dw
= pi
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ > 0,
dy¯
dγ
= − (P¯+piw)
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ2 < 0 showing
that the maximum competence increases with w and decreases with γ. Now observe
that if δ = 1, dy¯
dpi
= w
γ
> 0 and the statement in the proposition follows from
continuity.
Average competence We now prove the statements on average competence.
Effects of w and γ. Since ϕ is increasing in w and decreasing in γ, establishing
dE(yA)
dϕ
> 0 will prove dE(yA)
dw
> 0 and dE(yA)
dγ
< 0. Write out the expression for dE(yA)
dϕ
as
dE (yA)
dϕ
=
∫ P¯
0
ϕg(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp
−
∫ P¯
0
∫ ϕ
0
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp(∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp
)2 ∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ)
1
P¯
dp
=
∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp
·
(∫ P¯
0
ϕg(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp
−
∫ P¯
0
∫ ϕ
0
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ) 1
P¯
dp
)
,
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and use the equality ϕ = p+a
ψ
, to get
=
∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ)dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ)dp
·

∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy
−

∫ P¯
0
∫ a
ψ
0 yg(y)
1
P¯
dydp+
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+p
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
∫ a
ψ
0 g(y)dy
1
P¯
dp+
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+p
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy 1
P¯
dp


=
∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ)dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ)dp
·

∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy
−

∫ P¯
0
∫ aψ
0 yg(y)
1
P¯
dydp∫ P¯
0
∫ aψ
0 g(y)dy
1
P¯
dp+
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+pψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy 1
P¯
dp
+
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+pψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp
∫ P¯
0
∫ aψ
0 g(y)dy
1
P¯
dp+
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+pψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy 1
P¯
dp

 .
Changing the order of integration, so that
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+p
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp =
∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
∫ P¯
ψy−a yg(y)dpdy
1
P¯
=∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
P¯−(ψy−a)
P¯
yg(y)dy and
∫ P¯
0
∫ a+p
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy 1
P¯
dp =
∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
P¯−(ψy−a)
P¯
g(y)dy, we can write
=
∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ)dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ)dp
·

∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy
−

∫ aψ
0 yg(y)dy∫ aψ
0 yg(y)dy+
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
P¯−(ψy−a)
P¯
g(y)dy
+
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
P¯−(ψy−a)
P¯
yg(y)dy
∫ aψ
0 yg(y)dy+
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
P¯−(ψy−a)
P¯
g(y)dy

 ,
or
=
∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ)dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ)dp
·

∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy
−

∫ aψ
0 g(y)dy∫ aψ
0 g(y)dy+
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy
·
∫ aψ
0 yg(y)dy∫ aψ
0 g(y)dy
+
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy
∫ aψ
0 g(y)dy+
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy
·
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
yg(y)dy
∫ a+P¯ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy

 ,
21
which can be simplified as
=
∫ P¯
0
g(ϕ)dp∫ P¯
0
G(ϕ)dp
·

∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
g(y)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
−
α1 ·
∫ a
ψ
0 yg(y)dy∫ a
ψ
0 g(y)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
+α2 ·
∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
y (P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3

 ,
where
α1 =
∫ a
ψ
0 g(y)dy∫ a
ψ
0 g(y)dy +
∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy
α2 =
∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy∫ a
ψ
0 g(y)dy +
∫ a+P¯
ψ
a
ψ
(P¯−(ψy−a))
P¯
g(y)dy
.
Note that 1 ≥ αi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and α1 + α2 = 1. Then, if
∫ P¯+a
ψ
a
ψ
yg(y)dy > 0 (i.e. the
support of Y covers a neighborhood of some point on the selection line), A1 > A2
and A1 > A3 since
P¯−(ψy−a)
P¯
is a decreasing function in y. It follows that dE(yA)
dϕ
> 0.
Effects of pi. The effect of pi on ϕ is ambiguous and hence so is the effect of pi
on E (yA). This effect becomes unambiguous only as δ → 1 and y finite. At δ = 1,
ϕ = p+piw
γ
, and the effect of pi is similar to that of w, and dE(yA)
dpi
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose the party observes types (y, p) perfectly.
Negative screening. Here, the party selects an ability type of zero, which yields
more incompetent politicians than the average citizen.
Random (Athenian) screening. This obviously does not require the party to
observe types, as it can make random offers to those who volunteer. Clearly, the
party obtains politicians with the average competence in the volunteer pool (denoted
E (yA)). To show that this is worse than average competence in the population, we
use the identity ϕ ≡ p+piw
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ , noting that E (yA) < E (y) requires
E (yA) ≡
∫ P¯
0
∫ ϕ
0
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
∫ ϕ
0
g(y)dy 1
P¯
dp
<
∫ P¯
0
∫∞
0
yg(y)dy 1
P¯
dp∫ P¯
0
∫∞
0
g(y)dy 1
P¯
dp
≡ E (y) .
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This inequality follows from the fact that ϕ <∞ and E (yA) is increasing in ϕ.
Positive screening. This is the only form of screening that can deliver politicians
who, on average, are more able than the average citizen. By continuity, very mildly
positive screening – arbitrarily close to random screening – will yield politicians worse
than the population on average. Therefore, positive screening must be pronounced
enough for politicians to be better than the average. Under the assumptions that
types are perfectly observable and both traits are valuable, the party will select types(
P¯ , P¯+wpi
(pi(1−δ)+δ)γ
)
.
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